Blame SOURCES/glibc-rh1540480-3.patch

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commit 10e93d968716ab82931d593bada121c17c0a4b93
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Author: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
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Date:   Mon Dec 18 21:46:07 2017 +0000
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    elf: remove redundant __libc_enable_secure check from fillin_rpath
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    There are just two users of fillin_rpath: one is decompose_rpath that
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    sets check_trusted argument to 0, another one is _dl_init_paths that
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    sets check_trusted argument to __libc_enable_secure and invokes
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    fillin_rpath only when LD_LIBRARY_PATH is non-empty.
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    Starting with commit
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    glibc-2.25.90-512-gf6110a8fee2ca36f8e2d2abecf3cba9fa7b8ea7d,
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    LD_LIBRARY_PATH is ignored for __libc_enable_secure executables,
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    so check_trusted argument of fillin_rpath is always zero.
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    * elf/dl-load.c (is_trusted_path): Remove.
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    (fillin_rpath): Remove check_trusted argument and its use,
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    all callers changed.
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Index: glibc-2.17-c758a686/elf/dl-load.c
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===================================================================
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--- glibc-2.17-c758a686.orig/elf/dl-load.c
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+++ glibc-2.17-c758a686/elf/dl-load.c
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@@ -169,24 +169,6 @@ local_strdup (const char *s)
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 static bool
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-is_trusted_path (const char *path, size_t len)
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-{
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-  const char *trun = system_dirs;
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-
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-  for (size_t idx = 0; idx < nsystem_dirs_len; ++idx)
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-    {
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-      if (len == system_dirs_len[idx] && memcmp (trun, path, len) == 0)
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-	/* Found it.  */
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-	return true;
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-
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-      trun += system_dirs_len[idx] + 1;
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-    }
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-
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-  return false;
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-}
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-
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-
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-static bool
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 is_trusted_path_normalize (const char *path, size_t len)
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 {
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   if (len == 0)
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@@ -487,8 +469,7 @@ static size_t max_dirnamelen;
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 static struct r_search_path_elem **
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 fillin_rpath (char *rpath, struct r_search_path_elem **result, const char *sep,
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-	      int check_trusted, const char *what, const char *where,
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-	      struct link_map *l)
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+	      const char *what, const char *where, struct link_map *l)
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 {
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   char *cp;
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   size_t nelems = 0;
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@@ -518,13 +499,6 @@ fillin_rpath (char *rpath, struct r_sear
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       if (len > 0 && cp[len - 1] != '/')
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 	cp[len++] = '/';
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-      /* Make sure we don't use untrusted directories if we run SUID.  */
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-      if (__builtin_expect (check_trusted, 0) && !is_trusted_path (cp, len))
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-	{
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-	  free (to_free);
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-	  continue;
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-	}
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-
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       /* See if this directory is already known.  */
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       for (dirp = GL(dl_all_dirs); dirp != NULL; dirp = dirp->next)
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 	if (dirp->dirnamelen == len && memcmp (cp, dirp->dirname, len) == 0)
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@@ -674,7 +648,7 @@ decompose_rpath (struct r_search_path_st
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       _dl_signal_error (ENOMEM, NULL, NULL, errstring);
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     }
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-  fillin_rpath (copy, result, ":", 0, what, where, l);
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+  fillin_rpath (copy, result, ":", what, where, l);
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   /* Free the copied RPATH string.  `fillin_rpath' make own copies if
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      necessary.  */
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@@ -847,8 +821,7 @@ _dl_init_paths (const char *llp)
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 	}
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       (void) fillin_rpath (llp_tmp, env_path_list.dirs, ":;",
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-			   INTUSE(__libc_enable_secure), "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
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-			   NULL, l);
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+			   "LD_LIBRARY_PATH", NULL, l);
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       if (env_path_list.dirs[0] == NULL)
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 	{